Quantum theory: A pragmatist approach

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet, rival accounts of the meaning of quantum theory continue to proliferate. 1 In this article, I offer a diagnosis of this situation and outline a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent articles. 1 Introduction2 The Objectivity of Quantum Probabilities 2.1 Quantum probabilities are objective 2.2 Quantum probabilities do not represent physical reality3 How Quantum Theory Limits Description of Physical Reality4 The Relational Nature of Quantum States 4.1 Rovelli's relationism 4.2 Quantum Bayesian relationism 4.3 Reference-frame relationism 4.4 Agent-situation relationism and wave-collapse 4.5 Why quantum probabilities are not Lewisian chances5 The Objectivity of Physical Description in Quantum Theory 5.1 Why violations of Bell inequalities involve no physical non-locality 5.2 Objectivity, inter-subjectivity, and Wigner's friend6 Conclusion

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)729-771
Number of pages43
JournalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Volume63
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2012

Fingerprint

Pragmatist
Quantum Theory
Relationism
Quantum Probability
Physical
Objectivity
Frame of Reference
Dispute
Waves
Intersubjectivity
Eugene Wigner
Rivals
Philosopher
Physics
Violations
Nonlocality
Physicists

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science
  • History

Cite this

Quantum theory : A pragmatist approach. / Healey, Richard A.

In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 63, No. 4, 12.2012, p. 729-771.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{5fdf33b3ece047dc80d38597442a268d,
title = "Quantum theory: A pragmatist approach",
abstract = "While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet, rival accounts of the meaning of quantum theory continue to proliferate. 1 In this article, I offer a diagnosis of this situation and outline a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent articles. 1 Introduction2 The Objectivity of Quantum Probabilities 2.1 Quantum probabilities are objective 2.2 Quantum probabilities do not represent physical reality3 How Quantum Theory Limits Description of Physical Reality4 The Relational Nature of Quantum States 4.1 Rovelli's relationism 4.2 Quantum Bayesian relationism 4.3 Reference-frame relationism 4.4 Agent-situation relationism and wave-collapse 4.5 Why quantum probabilities are not Lewisian chances5 The Objectivity of Physical Description in Quantum Theory 5.1 Why violations of Bell inequalities involve no physical non-locality 5.2 Objectivity, inter-subjectivity, and Wigner's friend6 Conclusion",
author = "Healey, {Richard A}",
year = "2012",
month = "12",
doi = "10.1093/bjps/axr054",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "63",
pages = "729--771",
journal = "British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",
issn = "0007-0882",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Quantum theory

T2 - A pragmatist approach

AU - Healey, Richard A

PY - 2012/12

Y1 - 2012/12

N2 - While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet, rival accounts of the meaning of quantum theory continue to proliferate. 1 In this article, I offer a diagnosis of this situation and outline a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent articles. 1 Introduction2 The Objectivity of Quantum Probabilities 2.1 Quantum probabilities are objective 2.2 Quantum probabilities do not represent physical reality3 How Quantum Theory Limits Description of Physical Reality4 The Relational Nature of Quantum States 4.1 Rovelli's relationism 4.2 Quantum Bayesian relationism 4.3 Reference-frame relationism 4.4 Agent-situation relationism and wave-collapse 4.5 Why quantum probabilities are not Lewisian chances5 The Objectivity of Physical Description in Quantum Theory 5.1 Why violations of Bell inequalities involve no physical non-locality 5.2 Objectivity, inter-subjectivity, and Wigner's friend6 Conclusion

AB - While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet, rival accounts of the meaning of quantum theory continue to proliferate. 1 In this article, I offer a diagnosis of this situation and outline a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent articles. 1 Introduction2 The Objectivity of Quantum Probabilities 2.1 Quantum probabilities are objective 2.2 Quantum probabilities do not represent physical reality3 How Quantum Theory Limits Description of Physical Reality4 The Relational Nature of Quantum States 4.1 Rovelli's relationism 4.2 Quantum Bayesian relationism 4.3 Reference-frame relationism 4.4 Agent-situation relationism and wave-collapse 4.5 Why quantum probabilities are not Lewisian chances5 The Objectivity of Physical Description in Quantum Theory 5.1 Why violations of Bell inequalities involve no physical non-locality 5.2 Objectivity, inter-subjectivity, and Wigner's friend6 Conclusion

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84869109791&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84869109791&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/bjps/axr054

DO - 10.1093/bjps/axr054

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84869109791

VL - 63

SP - 729

EP - 771

JO - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

JF - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

SN - 0007-0882

IS - 4

ER -