## Abstract

In the 1970’s, a controversy arose about a probability problem posed by Irving Copi. One side argued that a common spontaneous intuition about the problem is correct; the other side argued that this intuition is mistaken. Here, I argue (1) that the naïve intuition yields the correct answer, but accidentally and for a wrong reason; (2) that a more reflective intuition yields a wrong answer, and hence, is also mistaken; and (3) that an even more reflective intuition yields the correct answer for a correct reason. This warrants what I call optimistic fallibilism concerning intuitions about probability: although intuition is certainly prone to error in this domain, intuition has the capacity for self-correction. A naïve intuition that is mistaken can be replaced by a distinct, reflective intuition; and a reflective intuition that is mistaken can be replaced by another reflective intuition–with the process ultimately yielding a sound intuition.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 327-344 |

Number of pages | 18 |

Journal | Philosophical Psychology |

Volume | 34 |

Issue number | 3 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - 2021 |

## Keywords

- Copi
- Intuition
- conditionalization
- credence
- probability

## ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Applied Psychology
- Philosophy