Relies to our critics

David Henderson, Terence Horgan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We respond to the central concerns raised by our commentators to our book, The Epistemological Spectrum. Casullo believes that our account of what we term "low-grade a priori" justification provides important clarification of a kind of philosophical reflection. However he objects to calling such reflection a priori. We explain what we think is at stake. Along the way, we comment on his idea of that there may be an epistemic payoff to making a distinction between assumptions and presumptions. In the book, we argued that an epistemically important form of nonaccidental reliability can be understood as a matter of processes being "transglobally reliable under modulational control." Graham recommends another form of nonaccidental reliability, one rooted in evolutionary etiology. We explain why we think that the reliability of perceptual processes is best understood as turning of the kinds of modulational control that we highlight. We clarify how this approach represents a kind of reasonable epistemic patience-modulational control takes time, as it must turn on agents generating information about their own capacities and foibles. Lyons raises interesting questions regarding how (what we term) morphological content possessed by the agent can do the work that we set for it. We argue that it is necessary in order for agents to accommodate the background information that is relevant to many central problems of belief formation. We clarify how it can be expected to work.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)549-564
Number of pages16
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume169
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2014

Keywords

  • A priori
  • Coherence
  • Epistemology
  • Justification
  • Naturalized epistemology
  • Reliabilism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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