Rolling preambles

Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems

Hanif Rahbari, Marwan M Krunz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Modern wireless systems and standards increasingly rely on OFDM for high-throughput communications. However, these systems are often highly vulnerable to selective jamming attacks, particularly when a jammer targets (part of) the known frame preamble. In this paper, we consider one of the most disruptive jamming attacks against the preamble-based frequency offset (FO) estimation in IEEE 802.11a/n/ac/ax systems and develop four techniques to mitigate this attack. Two of these techniques are based on randomly changing the first half of the standard frame preamble at the transmitter while maintaining its backward compatibility with legacy receivers. Specifically, we design a set of new preamble waveforms that satisfy the expected characteristics of a preamble in 802.11 systems. The other two techniques take a receiver-based approach and exploit the parts of the preamble that are not under attack to estimate the FO. We conduct extensive simulations and illustrative USRP experiments to study the effectiveness of these countermeasures.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages118-126
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781509030651
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 21 2017
Event2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2016 - Philadelphia, United States
Duration: Oct 17 2016Oct 19 2016

Other

Other2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2016
CountryUnited States
CityPhiladelphia
Period10/17/1610/19/16

Fingerprint

Jamming
Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
Transmitters
Throughput
Communication
Experiments

Keywords

  • frequency offset
  • IEEE 802.11
  • mitigation techniques
  • OFDM
  • PHY-layer
  • preamble
  • reactive jamming

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Cite this

Rahbari, H., & Krunz, M. M. (2017). Rolling preambles: Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems. In 2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2016 (pp. 118-126). [7860477] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2016.7860477

Rolling preambles : Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems. / Rahbari, Hanif; Krunz, Marwan M.

2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. p. 118-126 7860477.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Rahbari, H & Krunz, MM 2017, Rolling preambles: Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems. in 2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2016., 7860477, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 118-126, 2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2016, Philadelphia, United States, 10/17/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2016.7860477
Rahbari H, Krunz MM. Rolling preambles: Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems. In 2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2017. p. 118-126. 7860477 https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2016.7860477
Rahbari, Hanif ; Krunz, Marwan M. / Rolling preambles : Mitigating stealthy FO estimation attacks in OFDM-based 802.11 systems. 2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. pp. 118-126
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