Rotating credit collusion in repeated auctions with a single buyer and several sellers

Soo Hong Chew, Mei Hui Mao, Stanley S Reynolds

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This note follows an earlier paper [Chew and Mao (1983)] which investigated the Nash equilibrium strategies in a repeated bidding institution called the rotating credit association. We study a parallel application of the rotating credit structure for tacit collusion among several sellers with a single agent buying an indivisible commodity from them at regular intervals via sealed-bid auctions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-6
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume16
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1984

Fingerprint

Seller
Buyers
Collusion
Credit
Auctions
Sealed-bid auction
Bidding
Nash equilibrium
Commodities
Tacit collusion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Rotating credit collusion in repeated auctions with a single buyer and several sellers. / Chew, Soo Hong; Mao, Mei Hui; Reynolds, Stanley S.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 16, No. 1-2, 1984, p. 1-6.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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