Rotating credit collusion in repeated auctions with a single buyer and several sellers

Soo Hong Chew, Mei Hui Mao, Stanley S. Reynolds

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


This note follows an earlier paper [Chew and Mao (1983)] which investigated the Nash equilibrium strategies in a repeated bidding institution called the rotating credit association. We study a parallel application of the rotating credit structure for tacit collusion among several sellers with a single agent buying an indivisible commodity from them at regular intervals via sealed-bid auctions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-6
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number1-2
StatePublished - 1984


ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this