Rules

Terence E Horgan, John Tienson

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Contemporary cognitive science has two principal branches: the classical computational approach (sometimes called classicism) and connectionism. Rules are fundamental to theorizing about the basic units of processing in both classicism and connectionism. But we will be concerned primarily with rules that apply to representations and that determine transitions from one cognitive/representational state to the next. Such rules are fundamental to classicism, since, according to classicism, cognitive processes simply are rule-governed cognitive state transitions. Rules that apply to representations are not a built-in feature of connectionist architecture, so the role of such rules in connectionism is less clear. We will argue that they are neither necessary nor (in general) desirable in connectionism. We discuss the status of rules first in classicism, then in connectionism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationA Companion to Cognitive Science
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
Pages660-670
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9781405164535
ISBN (Print)9780631218517
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 26 2008
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Cognitive Science

Keywords

  • Baby steps
  • Bottoming out
  • Cognitive science
  • Representations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuroscience(all)

Cite this

Horgan, T. E., & Tienson, J. (2008). Rules. In A Companion to Cognitive Science (pp. 660-670). Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405164535.ch52

Rules. / Horgan, Terence E; Tienson, John.

A Companion to Cognitive Science. Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. p. 660-670.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Horgan, TE & Tienson, J 2008, Rules. in A Companion to Cognitive Science. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 660-670. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405164535.ch52
Horgan TE, Tienson J. Rules. In A Companion to Cognitive Science. Wiley-Blackwell. 2008. p. 660-670 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405164535.ch52
Horgan, Terence E ; Tienson, John. / Rules. A Companion to Cognitive Science. Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. pp. 660-670
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