Much work in epistemology in the aftermath of Gettier's counterexample to the justified true belief account of knowledge was concerned with the possible existence of modal conditions on knowledge, conditions which related the proposition believed with the fact that made it true. Sosa was an adherent of such a position, putting forward a safety condition on knowledge. Lately, however, Sosa's stance with respect to safety has become much more subtle. This chapter has two aims. First, I want to trace the evolution of Sosa's thought on safety. Second, I want to examine the issue of whether there are epistemic analogues of Frankfurt cases. The two aims are connected: I suggest that we should interpret Sosa as having abandoned the safety condition altogether because of the existence of epistemic Frankfurt cases.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Virtuous Thoughts|
|Subtitle of host publication||The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa|
|Number of pages||14|
|State||Published - Jan 1 2013|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)