Science and the phenomenal

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The Hard Problem of the mind is addressed and it is argued that physical-phenomenal property identities have the same status as the identification of an ostended bit of physical space and the coordinates assigned the spot on a map of the terrain. It is argued, that is to say, that such identities are, or follow from, stipulations which interpret the map.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)351-369
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume66
Issue number3
StatePublished - Sep 1999

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Physical
Property Identity
Stipulations
Hard Problem

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • History and Philosophy of Science
  • Philosophy

Cite this

Science and the phenomenal. / Ismael, Jenann -.

In: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 66, No. 3, 09.1999, p. 351-369.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Ismael, J 1999, 'Science and the phenomenal', Philosophy of Science, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 351-369.
Ismael, Jenann -. / Science and the phenomenal. In: Philosophy of Science. 1999 ; Vol. 66, No. 3. pp. 351-369.
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