Secrecy games over the cognitive channel

Elizabeth Toher, Onur Ozan Koyluoglu, Hesham El Gamal

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A secure communication game is considered for the cognitive channel with a confidential primary message, where the primary user is interested in maximizing its secure rate with lowest possible power consumption and the utility of the cognitive user is a weighted sum of the primary secrecy rate and the cognitive rate (corresponds to a spectrum law in favor of the legacy owners of the spectrum). An achievable rate region is derived for the channel with message splitting at the cognitive radio and noise forwarding. The game considers the case with no common message, but shows that even this limited scenario can still be beneficial. The established Nash Equilibrium (NE) shows that the cognitive user trades noise for bits. The results are also interesting in the sense that both users can benefit (by playing the distributed game) compared to their throughput resulting from the non-cooperative scenario.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings
Pages2637-2641
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event2010 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2010 - Austin, TX, United States
Duration: Jun 13 2010Jun 18 2010

Other

Other2010 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2010
CountryUnited States
CityAustin, TX
Period6/13/106/18/10

Fingerprint

Cognitive radio
Electric power utilization
Throughput
Game
Scenarios
Secure Communication
Cognitive Radio
Weighted Sums
Nash Equilibrium
Power Consumption
Secure communication

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Mathematics
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Information Systems

Cite this

Toher, E., Koyluoglu, O. O., & Gamal, H. E. (2010). Secrecy games over the cognitive channel. In IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings (pp. 2637-2641). [5513708] https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2010.5513708

Secrecy games over the cognitive channel. / Toher, Elizabeth; Koyluoglu, Onur Ozan; Gamal, Hesham El.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings. 2010. p. 2637-2641 5513708.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Toher, E, Koyluoglu, OO & Gamal, HE 2010, Secrecy games over the cognitive channel. in IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings., 5513708, pp. 2637-2641, 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2010, Austin, TX, United States, 6/13/10. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2010.5513708
Toher E, Koyluoglu OO, Gamal HE. Secrecy games over the cognitive channel. In IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings. 2010. p. 2637-2641. 5513708 https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2010.5513708
Toher, Elizabeth ; Koyluoglu, Onur Ozan ; Gamal, Hesham El. / Secrecy games over the cognitive channel. IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory - Proceedings. 2010. pp. 2637-2641
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