Sensory holism and functionalism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

I defend the possibility of a functional account of the intrinsic qualities of sensory experience against the claim that functional characterization can only describe such qualities to the level of isomorphism of relational structures on those qualities. A form sensory holism might be true concerning the phenomenal, and this holism would account for some antifunctionalist intuition evoked by inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments. Sensory holism is compatible with the correctness of functionalism about the phenomenal.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)972
Number of pages1
JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume22
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - 1999

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
  • Neuroscience(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology

Cite this

Sensory holism and functionalism. / Tolliver, Joseph T.

In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 6, 1999, p. 972.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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