Simulating team formation in social networks

Nathaniel Dykhuis, Paul R Cohen, Yu Han Chang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This research examines the problem of team formation in social networks. Agents, each possessing certain skills, are given tasks that require particular combinations of skills, and they must form teams to complete the tasks and receive payoffs. However, agents can only join teams to which they have direct connections in the social network. We find that a simple, locally-rational team formation strategy can form team configurations with near-optimal earnings, though this greedy hill-climbing search does converge to suboptimal local maxima. Under this strategy, a variety of random graph topologies not only achieve earnings competitive with complete graphs, but also are much more efficient, achieving these results in less time and with far fewer connections between agents. Several variations were tested; the best results for average earnings and equality occurred when groups were allowed to merge and expel agents, and when groups were fully connected during formation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013
Pages244-253
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Social Computing, SocialCom 2013, the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Big Data, BigData 2013, the 2013 Int. Conf. on Economic Computing, EconCom 2013, the 2013 PASSAT 2013, and the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on BioMedCom 2013 - Washington, DC, United States
Duration: Sep 8 2013Sep 14 2013

Other

Other2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Social Computing, SocialCom 2013, the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Big Data, BigData 2013, the 2013 Int. Conf. on Economic Computing, EconCom 2013, the 2013 PASSAT 2013, and the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on BioMedCom 2013
CountryUnited States
CityWashington, DC
Period9/8/139/14/13

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software

Cite this

Dykhuis, N., Cohen, P. R., & Chang, Y. H. (2013). Simulating team formation in social networks. In Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013 (pp. 244-253). [6693339] https://doi.org/10.1109/SocialCom.2013.42

Simulating team formation in social networks. / Dykhuis, Nathaniel; Cohen, Paul R; Chang, Yu Han.

Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013. 2013. p. 244-253 6693339.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Dykhuis, N, Cohen, PR & Chang, YH 2013, Simulating team formation in social networks. in Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013., 6693339, pp. 244-253, 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Social Computing, SocialCom 2013, the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Big Data, BigData 2013, the 2013 Int. Conf. on Economic Computing, EconCom 2013, the 2013 PASSAT 2013, and the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on BioMedCom 2013, Washington, DC, United States, 9/8/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/SocialCom.2013.42
Dykhuis N, Cohen PR, Chang YH. Simulating team formation in social networks. In Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013. 2013. p. 244-253. 6693339 https://doi.org/10.1109/SocialCom.2013.42
Dykhuis, Nathaniel ; Cohen, Paul R ; Chang, Yu Han. / Simulating team formation in social networks. Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013. 2013. pp. 244-253
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