Situations and Responsiveness to Reasons*

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the "situationist threat" has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalNous
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2017

Fingerprint

Reasons-responsiveness
Threat
Moral Responsibility
Responsiveness
Theorists
Situationists
Social Psychology
Classical Studies
Scenarios
Situational
Possible Worlds

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Situations and Responsiveness to Reasons*. / Sartorio, Ana C.

In: Nous, 2017.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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