Slippery property rights: Multiple water uses and the neoliberal model in Chile, 1981-1995

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

46 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Fifteen years ago Chile adopted a neoliberal Water Code characterized by strong private property rights, market forces and incentives, and weak state regulation. Chile remains the leading international example of free market water policies. Coordinating multiple water uses is left to private bargaining among the owners of water rights, with conflicts going to a judiciary that has expanded powers. A case study of irrigation-hydroelectric relations shows the current model for river basin management to have serious flaws. The results highlight some of the limitations of free market environmental policies, particularly their dependence on effective legal and institutional frameworks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)109-152
Number of pages44
JournalNatural Resources Journal
Volume38
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1998
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

property rights
right of ownership
Chile
water use
water
market
basin management
bargaining
institutional framework
environmental policy
private property
incentive
legislation
judiciary
river basin
irrigation
river
regulation
management

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Environmental Science (miscellaneous)
  • Law

Cite this

Slippery property rights : Multiple water uses and the neoliberal model in Chile, 1981-1995. / Bauer, Carl.

In: Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1998, p. 109-152.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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