Suppositional reasoning and perceptual justification

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call "basic justification theories." I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)215-219
Number of pages5
JournalLogos and Episteme
Volume7
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2016

Keywords

  • A priori
  • Basic justification theories
  • Bootstrapping
  • Perception

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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