Tacit coordination in choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries

Amnon Rapoport, Darryl A. Seale, Lisa Ordóñez

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Tacit coordination is studied in a class of games in which each of n = 20 players is required to choose between two courses of actions. The first action offers each player a fixed outcome whereas the second presents her the opportunity of participating in a lottery with probabilities that are determined endogenously. Across multiple iterations of the game and trial-to-trial changes in the composition of the lottery, we observe a remarkably good coordination on the aggregate but not individual level. We further observe systematic deviations from the Nash equilibrium solution that are accounted for quite well by a simple adaptive learning model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)21-45
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Risk and Uncertainty
Volume25
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2002

Keywords

  • Interactive decision making
  • Lotteries
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Tacit coordination

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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