The appearance and the reality of quid pro quo corruption: An empirical investigation

Christopher T Robertson, D. Alex Winkelman, Kelly Bergstrand, Darren Modzelewski

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The Supreme Court says that campaign finance regulations are unconstitutional unless they target "quid pro quo" corruption or its appearance. To test those appearances, we fielded two studies. First, in a highly realistic simulation, three grand juries deliberated on charges that a campaign spender bribed a Congressperson. Second, 1271 representative online respondents considered whether to convict, with five variables manipulated randomly. In both studies, jurors found quid pro quo corruption for behaviors they believed to be common. This research suggests that Supreme Court decisions were wrongly decided, and that Congress and the states have greater authority to regulate campaign finance. Prosecutions for bribery raise serious problems for the First Amendment, due process, and separation of powers. Safe harbors may be a solution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)375-438
Number of pages64
JournalJournal of Legal Analysis
Volume8
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2016

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corruption
campaign
Supreme Court
finance
separation of powers
harbor
court decision
prosecution
amendment
regulation
simulation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Law

Cite this

The appearance and the reality of quid pro quo corruption : An empirical investigation. / Robertson, Christopher T; Alex Winkelman, D.; Bergstrand, Kelly; Modzelewski, Darren.

In: Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2016, p. 375-438.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Robertson, Christopher T ; Alex Winkelman, D. ; Bergstrand, Kelly ; Modzelewski, Darren. / The appearance and the reality of quid pro quo corruption : An empirical investigation. In: Journal of Legal Analysis. 2016 ; Vol. 8, No. 2. pp. 375-438.
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