The Demands of Impartiality and the Evolution of Morality

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter argues that Kantian-inspired conceptions of morality must embrace significant parts of an evolutionary view of ethics. According to one sort of Kantian, to respect others as free and equal persons requires that the moral demands made on them are uniquely justified from the impartial perspective. It is argued that under conditions of evaluative pluralism, this idea of impartial reflection is indeterminate. Rational reflection can narrow the field, but actual interactions of good-willed people are needed to fill in the large gaps, and give us a morality that we all can will. Morality is properly seen as consisting of self-imposed requirements verified from the impartial perspective and as having a history that is path-dependent. Indeed, only an evolved morality can be justified to everyone.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPartiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Print)9780191595233, 9780199579952
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2011

Fingerprint

Morality
Impartiality
Immanuel Kant
Pluralism
Indeterminate
Person
Interaction
History
Evolutionary
Conception

Keywords

  • Evolution
  • Impartiality
  • Kantian ethics
  • Public reason

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Gaus, G. F. (2011). The Demands of Impartiality and the Evolution of Morality. In Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.003.0003

The Demands of Impartiality and the Evolution of Morality. / Gaus, Gerald F.

Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Gaus, GF 2011, The Demands of Impartiality and the Evolution of Morality. in Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.003.0003
Gaus GF. The Demands of Impartiality and the Evolution of Morality. In Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. Oxford University Press. 2011 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.003.0003
Gaus, Gerald F. / The Demands of Impartiality and the Evolution of Morality. Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World. Oxford University Press, 2011.
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