The determination of local public expenditures and the principal and agent relation: A case study

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21 Scopus citations


The principal and agent relationship is important in the public sector. There, elected or appointed representatives act on behalf of the citizens of their jurisdictions. This paper examines the importance of the budget referendum, which allows the principals to approve or disapprove the proposal of a set of agents, in the context of local public expenditure decisions. We test the null hypothesis that the institution of referendum, when compared to a nonreferendum institution, does not lead to significantly different expenditure behavior.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)71-87
Number of pages17
JournalPublic Choice
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 1 1983


ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics

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