The effect of consequential thinking on trust game behavior

Tamar Kugler, Terence Connolly, Edgar E. Kausel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Contrary to rational Expected Monetary Value (EMV) predictions that no money will be transferred in Trust Games, in experiments players make positive transfers. Theorists have proposed modifying the Sender's utility function while retaining utilitymaximization assumptions to account for this behavior. Such accounts assume that Senders can grasp the possible outcomes of their choices, their probabilities, and utilities. In reality, however, Senders' choices are unexpectedly complex, and the assumption that they approximate expected utility maximization is highly implausible. Instead, we suggest that Senders are guided by general propensities to trust others. Two experiments examine the effect of inducing consequential thought on Sender behavior. One induced consequential thought directly; the other did so indirectly. The amount sent was significantly reduced following either manipulation. This suggests that models of Sender behavior in Complex Trust Games should not assume that participants routinely engage in consequential thinking (CT) of the depth that would be required for utility maximization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)101-119
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Behavioral Decision Making
Volume22
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2009

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experiment
manipulation
money
Trust game
Thinking
Experiment
Thought
Utility maximization
Manipulation
Propensity
Prediction
Expected utility maximization
Utility function
Theorists
Expected Utility
Players

Keywords

  • Consequential thinking
  • Game
  • Regret
  • Trust

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

The effect of consequential thinking on trust game behavior. / Kugler, Tamar; Connolly, Terence; Kausel, Edgar E.

In: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 22, No. 2, 04.2009, p. 101-119.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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