The Epistemic Features of Group Belief

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifically, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's influential “plural subject” account of group belief, group views are unlikely to be epistemically rational.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)161-175
Number of pages15
JournalEpisteme
Volume2
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2006

Fingerprint

Word Groups
Plural Subject
Epistemology
Margaret Gilbert

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this

The Epistemic Features of Group Belief. / Mathiesen, Kristy K.

In: Episteme, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2006, p. 161-175.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Mathiesen, Kristy K. / The Epistemic Features of Group Belief. In: Episteme. 2006 ; Vol. 2, No. 3. pp. 161-175.
@article{fa23d94f8ab846f9838b9cb715be2cf1,
title = "The Epistemic Features of Group Belief",
abstract = "Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifically, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's influential “plural subject” account of group belief, group views are unlikely to be epistemically rational.",
author = "Mathiesen, {Kristy K}",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.161",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "2",
pages = "161--175",
journal = "Episteme",
issn = "1742-3600",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Epistemic Features of Group Belief

AU - Mathiesen, Kristy K

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifically, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's influential “plural subject” account of group belief, group views are unlikely to be epistemically rational.

AB - Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifically, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's influential “plural subject” account of group belief, group views are unlikely to be epistemically rational.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85010637310&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85010637310&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.161

DO - 10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.161

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85010637310

VL - 2

SP - 161

EP - 175

JO - Episteme

JF - Episteme

SN - 1742-3600

IS - 3

ER -