THE EQUALITY NORM MEETS the EVOLUTION of PROPERTY in the LAW of "tAKINGS"

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

A norm of equal treatment is cited regularly in the American jurisprudence of property "takings" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, as a benchmark of fair treatment of owners. According to an increasingly prevalent version of this equality norm, courts should look to parity of treatment among property owners in investigating whether particular regulations "take" property. This essay argues, however, that such an equality norm is misplaced, and that courts should judge fairness by the criterion of expectation - including reasonable expectations of regulation. A norm of equality becomes problematic in the face of the economic theory of the evolution of property. This theory posits that as resources become more congested, their uses carry increasing common pool costs or "externalities" - a scenario that should predictably result in more stringent resource management - up to and including the establishment of regulatory regimes as well as property rights themselves. This evolutionary pattern, however, places earlier and later resource users in different positions vis-à-vis both common pool externalities and regulatory responses, and their different temporal positions fragment the meaning of equal treatment and destabilize it as a jurisprudential norm. This essay argues that while equal treatment may be a benchmark for special or invidious cases, like those relating to civil rights, the great bulk of takings cases involve regulatory responses to congesting resources, where a norm of equal treatment breaks down. Thus, in seeking fair treatment, takings jurisprudence should downplay equality and instead look to the understanding of property as a basis of expectations - but those expectations should include the anticipation of reasonable regulatory responses to resource congestion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)149-172
Number of pages24
JournalSocial Philosophy and Policy
Volume35
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2018

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equal treatment
equality
resources
jurisprudence
regulation
civil rights
economic theory
right of ownership
fairness
amendment
constitution
scenario
costs
management
Resources
Equality

Keywords

  • equality norm
  • evolution of property
  • property expectation
  • property takings
  • regulatory risk
  • resource congestion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

THE EQUALITY NORM MEETS the EVOLUTION of PROPERTY in the LAW of "tAKINGS". / Rose, Carol M.

In: Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 35, No. 1, 01.06.2018, p. 149-172.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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