The incompatibility of free will and naturalism

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4 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Consequence Argument is a staple in the defence of libertarianism, the view that free will is incompatible with determinism and that humans have free will. It is often thought that libertarianism is consistent with a certain naturalistic view of the worldthat is, even if libertarians are right, free will can be had without metaphysical commitments beyond those provided by our best (indeterministic) physics. In this paper, I argue that libertarians who endorse the Consequence Argument are forced to reject this naturalistic worldview. The Consequence Argument has a sister argumentI call it the Supervenience Argumentwhich cannot be rejected without threatening either the Consequence Argument or the naturalistic worldview in question.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)565-587
Number of pages23
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume87
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2009
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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