The phenomenology of virtue

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

31 Scopus citations

Abstract

What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person's thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle's suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant to the virtuous person. I try to do this, using the work of the contemporary social psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and his work on the 'flow experience'. Crucial here is the point that I consider accounts of virtue which take it to have the structure of a practical expertise or skill. It is when we are most engaged in skilful complex activity that the activity is experienced as 'unimpeded', in Aristotle's terms, or as 'flow'. This experience does not, as might at first appear, preclude thoughtful involvement and reflection. Although we can say what in general the phenomenology of virtue is like, each of us only has some more or less dim idea of it from the extent to which we are virtuous-that is, for most of us, not very much.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)21-34
Number of pages14
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2008

Keywords

  • Expertise
  • Flow
  • Phenomenology
  • Pleasure
  • Practical skill
  • Virtue

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Cognitive Neuroscience

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