The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

What is the relationship between the concepts of autonomous and morally responsible agency? For those who acknowledge the legitimacy of each, the assumption has been that the connection is quite tight: Either it is thought that they entail each other or, more conservatively, that autonomous agency is necessary for morally responsible agency. I shall argue that, on one reasonable account of autonomy, neither is necessary for the other. My argument turns upon establishing two theses: First, the epistemic condition for autonomous agency involves less than what is required for morally responsible agency. Second, the control condition for autonomous agency involves more than what is requiredfor morally responsible agency. If the first thesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for autonomous agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding epistemic condition for morally responsible agency. This wouldprove that morally responsible agency is not necessary for autonomous agency. If the secondthesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for morally responsible agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding control condition for autonomous agency. This wouldprove that autonomous agency is not necessary for morally responsible agency. i. two concepts: autonomous agency and morally responsible agency To begin, let us treat autonomous agency in terms of self-rule, and let us assume that it is not a necessary condition of personhood but merely demarcates a special class of persons. Parsed accordingly, it is possible that some persons are nonautonomous.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPersonal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages205-234
Number of pages30
ISBN (Print)9780511614194, 0521837960, 9780521837965
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2005
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Person
Legitimacy
Personhood
Autonomy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

McKenna, M. S. (2005). The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency. In Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy (pp. 205-234). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614194.010

The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency. / McKenna, Michael S.

Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 205-234.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

McKenna, MS 2005, The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency. in Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, pp. 205-234. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614194.010
McKenna MS. The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency. In Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 2005. p. 205-234 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614194.010
McKenna, Michael S. / The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency. Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 2005. pp. 205-234
@inbook{e62810fd8cc54b80abfd4acff9f5ec30,
title = "The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency",
abstract = "What is the relationship between the concepts of autonomous and morally responsible agency? For those who acknowledge the legitimacy of each, the assumption has been that the connection is quite tight: Either it is thought that they entail each other or, more conservatively, that autonomous agency is necessary for morally responsible agency. I shall argue that, on one reasonable account of autonomy, neither is necessary for the other. My argument turns upon establishing two theses: First, the epistemic condition for autonomous agency involves less than what is required for morally responsible agency. Second, the control condition for autonomous agency involves more than what is requiredfor morally responsible agency. If the first thesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for autonomous agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding epistemic condition for morally responsible agency. This wouldprove that morally responsible agency is not necessary for autonomous agency. If the secondthesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for morally responsible agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding control condition for autonomous agency. This wouldprove that autonomous agency is not necessary for morally responsible agency. i. two concepts: autonomous agency and morally responsible agency To begin, let us treat autonomous agency in terms of self-rule, and let us assume that it is not a necessary condition of personhood but merely demarcates a special class of persons. Parsed accordingly, it is possible that some persons are nonautonomous.",
author = "McKenna, {Michael S}",
year = "2005",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/CBO9780511614194.010",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9780511614194",
pages = "205--234",
booktitle = "Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency

AU - McKenna, Michael S

PY - 2005/1/1

Y1 - 2005/1/1

N2 - What is the relationship between the concepts of autonomous and morally responsible agency? For those who acknowledge the legitimacy of each, the assumption has been that the connection is quite tight: Either it is thought that they entail each other or, more conservatively, that autonomous agency is necessary for morally responsible agency. I shall argue that, on one reasonable account of autonomy, neither is necessary for the other. My argument turns upon establishing two theses: First, the epistemic condition for autonomous agency involves less than what is required for morally responsible agency. Second, the control condition for autonomous agency involves more than what is requiredfor morally responsible agency. If the first thesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for autonomous agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding epistemic condition for morally responsible agency. This wouldprove that morally responsible agency is not necessary for autonomous agency. If the secondthesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for morally responsible agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding control condition for autonomous agency. This wouldprove that autonomous agency is not necessary for morally responsible agency. i. two concepts: autonomous agency and morally responsible agency To begin, let us treat autonomous agency in terms of self-rule, and let us assume that it is not a necessary condition of personhood but merely demarcates a special class of persons. Parsed accordingly, it is possible that some persons are nonautonomous.

AB - What is the relationship between the concepts of autonomous and morally responsible agency? For those who acknowledge the legitimacy of each, the assumption has been that the connection is quite tight: Either it is thought that they entail each other or, more conservatively, that autonomous agency is necessary for morally responsible agency. I shall argue that, on one reasonable account of autonomy, neither is necessary for the other. My argument turns upon establishing two theses: First, the epistemic condition for autonomous agency involves less than what is required for morally responsible agency. Second, the control condition for autonomous agency involves more than what is requiredfor morally responsible agency. If the first thesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for autonomous agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding epistemic condition for morally responsible agency. This wouldprove that morally responsible agency is not necessary for autonomous agency. If the secondthesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for morally responsible agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding control condition for autonomous agency. This wouldprove that autonomous agency is not necessary for morally responsible agency. i. two concepts: autonomous agency and morally responsible agency To begin, let us treat autonomous agency in terms of self-rule, and let us assume that it is not a necessary condition of personhood but merely demarcates a special class of persons. Parsed accordingly, it is possible that some persons are nonautonomous.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84928857145&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84928857145&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/CBO9780511614194.010

DO - 10.1017/CBO9780511614194.010

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:84928857145

SN - 9780511614194

SN - 0521837960

SN - 9780521837965

SP - 205

EP - 234

BT - Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy

PB - Cambridge University Press

ER -