The robustness of honesty effects on budget proposals when the superior has rejection authority

Jeremy Douthit, Douglas E. Stevens

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Rankin, Schwartz, and Young (2008) find experimental evidence that manipulating whether the budget request of the subordinate requires a factual assertion has no effect on budgetary slack when the superior can reject the budget. This calls into question the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings. Using Rankin et al.'s (2008) manipulation to capture honesty effects, we examine the robustness of honesty effects on budget proposals when the superior has rejection authority in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we document that honesty has a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of distributional fairness is reduced by withholding the relative pay of the superior from the subordinate. In Experiment 2, we document that honesty continues to have a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of reciprocity is increased by giving the superior the ability to set the subordinate's salary. Thus, our evidence suggests that honesty effects on budget proposals are generally robust to giving the superior rejection authority. Our study helps explain prior experimental results and clarifies the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)467-493
Number of pages27
JournalAccounting Review
Volume90
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015

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Honesty
Authority
Robustness
Experiment
Participative budgeting
Manipulation
Salary
Fairness

Keywords

  • Budgetary slack
  • Distributional fairness
  • Honesty
  • Reciprocity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The robustness of honesty effects on budget proposals when the superior has rejection authority. / Douthit, Jeremy; Stevens, Douglas E.

In: Accounting Review, Vol. 90, No. 2, 2015, p. 467-493.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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