The roles of religious conviction in a publicly justified polity: The implications of convergence, asymmetry and political institutions

Gerald F Gaus, Kevin Vallier

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

73 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We discuss whether religious reasons may be appealed to in justification and political debate in a polity whose laws must be justified to those subject to them in terms of reasons that are accessible to one and all. We argue that, properly understood, a commitment to public justification provides no grounds for the exclusion of religious reasons from politics. We trace the view that religious reasons are excluded from public reason to three basic errors: (1) the error of supposing that public justification must be based on shared reasons; (2) the error of supposing that in public justification the same constraints apply to reasons to impose coercion and reasons to resist coercion; and (3) the error of supposing that generating publicly justified laws must occur through public deliberations in which all aim at such laws.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)51-76
Number of pages26
JournalPhilosophy and Social Criticism
Volume35
Issue number1-2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2009

Fingerprint

political institution
asymmetry
Law
deliberation
exclusion
commitment
politics
Asymmetry
Polity
Conviction
Political Institutions
Religion
Public Justification
Coercion

Keywords

  • Liberalism
  • Pluralism
  • Public justification
  • Public reason
  • Religion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

@article{5e3856ae644a458a880646fb102a905f,
title = "The roles of religious conviction in a publicly justified polity: The implications of convergence, asymmetry and political institutions",
abstract = "We discuss whether religious reasons may be appealed to in justification and political debate in a polity whose laws must be justified to those subject to them in terms of reasons that are accessible to one and all. We argue that, properly understood, a commitment to public justification provides no grounds for the exclusion of religious reasons from politics. We trace the view that religious reasons are excluded from public reason to three basic errors: (1) the error of supposing that public justification must be based on shared reasons; (2) the error of supposing that in public justification the same constraints apply to reasons to impose coercion and reasons to resist coercion; and (3) the error of supposing that generating publicly justified laws must occur through public deliberations in which all aim at such laws.",
keywords = "Liberalism, Pluralism, Public justification, Public reason, Religion",
author = "Gaus, {Gerald F} and Kevin Vallier",
year = "2009",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0191453708098754",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "35",
pages = "51--76",
journal = "Philosophy and Social Criticism",
issn = "0191-4537",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",
number = "1-2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The roles of religious conviction in a publicly justified polity

T2 - The implications of convergence, asymmetry and political institutions

AU - Gaus, Gerald F

AU - Vallier, Kevin

PY - 2009/1

Y1 - 2009/1

N2 - We discuss whether religious reasons may be appealed to in justification and political debate in a polity whose laws must be justified to those subject to them in terms of reasons that are accessible to one and all. We argue that, properly understood, a commitment to public justification provides no grounds for the exclusion of religious reasons from politics. We trace the view that religious reasons are excluded from public reason to three basic errors: (1) the error of supposing that public justification must be based on shared reasons; (2) the error of supposing that in public justification the same constraints apply to reasons to impose coercion and reasons to resist coercion; and (3) the error of supposing that generating publicly justified laws must occur through public deliberations in which all aim at such laws.

AB - We discuss whether religious reasons may be appealed to in justification and political debate in a polity whose laws must be justified to those subject to them in terms of reasons that are accessible to one and all. We argue that, properly understood, a commitment to public justification provides no grounds for the exclusion of religious reasons from politics. We trace the view that religious reasons are excluded from public reason to three basic errors: (1) the error of supposing that public justification must be based on shared reasons; (2) the error of supposing that in public justification the same constraints apply to reasons to impose coercion and reasons to resist coercion; and (3) the error of supposing that generating publicly justified laws must occur through public deliberations in which all aim at such laws.

KW - Liberalism

KW - Pluralism

KW - Public justification

KW - Public reason

KW - Religion

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=59349096510&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=59349096510&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/0191453708098754

DO - 10.1177/0191453708098754

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:59349096510

VL - 35

SP - 51

EP - 76

JO - Philosophy and Social Criticism

JF - Philosophy and Social Criticism

SN - 0191-4537

IS - 1-2

ER -