The sound of silence: A license to be selfish

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We theoretically formulate the idea that if a person stays silent in a situation where a promise could have been made, then he or she will subsequently act as if having a license to be selfish. We then report results from an experimental test that provides some support.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)68-70
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume182
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 1 2019

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Keywords

  • Active-non-communication
  • Cost of lying
  • Pre-fab promises
  • Psychological costs
  • Trust game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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