The sound of silence

A license to be selfish

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We theoretically formulate the idea that if a person stays silent in a situation where a promise could have been made, then he or she will subsequently act as if having a license to be selfish. We then report results from an experimental test that provides some support.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)68-70
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume182
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2019

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Experimental tests

Keywords

  • Active-non-communication
  • Cost of lying
  • Pre-fab promises
  • Psychological costs
  • Trust game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The sound of silence : A license to be selfish. / Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni; Dufwenberg, Martin; Papa, Stefano.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 182, 01.09.2019, p. 68-70.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; Dufwenberg, Martin ; Papa, Stefano. / The sound of silence : A license to be selfish. In: Economics Letters. 2019 ; Vol. 182. pp. 68-70.
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