The Synthetic Unity of Truth

Robert Barnard, Terence Horgan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

This chapter articulates a version of correspondence theory that holds that truth is always correspondence. Separating questions about the nature of truth from questions about the correct ontology permits a metaphysically neutral position. When assertoric language is deployed in such a way that its singular terms and unnegated existential quantifications carry ontological commitment to particulars that putatively belong to the right ontology and its predicates carry ontological commitment to properties and relations that putatively belong to the right ontology, then correspondence functions in what is called a direct way. The chapter holds that truth is always correspondence, but is rarely direct, and propositions native to different discourses can all be literally true via correspondence, although very often their truth constitutes an indirect kind of correspondence that does not require the right ontology to include objects, properties, or relations answering to the proposition's singular, predicative, or existential-quantificational constituents.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationTruth and Pluralism
Subtitle of host publicationCurrent Debates
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780199332427
ISBN (Print)9780195387469
DOIs
StatePublished - May 23 2013

Keywords

  • Alethic pluralism
  • Direct correspondence
  • Indirect correspondence
  • Mediated correspondence
  • Ontological commitment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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  • Cite this

    Barnard, R., & Horgan, T. (2013). The Synthetic Unity of Truth. In Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.003.0009