The “unreliability” of epistemic intuitions

Joshua Alexander, Jonathan M Weinberg

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Debate over the status of intuitions in philosophical practice is marred by an ambiguity about “unreliability.” Many authors, including Boyd and Nagel in this volume, have defended the reliability of intuitions in the baseline accuracy sense of “on balance, right more often than wrong.” We agree that intuitions should likely be considered reliable in that sense. But that is not the sense in which their reliability has been under attack. Rather, the sense of reliability most relevant for understanding experimentalist critiques of intuitions is trustworthiness, for which baseline accuracy is perhaps a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationCurrent Controversies in Experimental Philosophy
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages128-145
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9780203122884
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014

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Intuition
Attack
Trustworthiness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2014). The “unreliability” of epistemic intuitions. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (pp. 128-145). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203122884

The “unreliability” of epistemic intuitions. / Alexander, Joshua; Weinberg, Jonathan M.

Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Taylor and Francis, 2014. p. 128-145.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Alexander, J & Weinberg, JM 2014, The “unreliability” of epistemic intuitions. in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Taylor and Francis, pp. 128-145. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203122884
Alexander J, Weinberg JM. The “unreliability” of epistemic intuitions. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Taylor and Francis. 2014. p. 128-145 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203122884
Alexander, Joshua ; Weinberg, Jonathan M. / The “unreliability” of epistemic intuitions. Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Taylor and Francis, 2014. pp. 128-145
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