Transboundary water management game-theoretic lessons for projects on the US-Mexico border

George B Frisvold, Margriet F. Caswell

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

47 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Of the twelve million people who live within 100 km of the US-Mexico border, 90 percent are clustered in transboundary sister cities that share common water sources and pollution problems. New institutions created to address environmental concerns over NAFTA offer the promise of greater financial and technical assistance for water management in border cities. This paper reviews US-Mexico border water issues and institutions. Using insights from game theory, it draws policy lessons for institutions funding border water projects. We examine how the design of assistance programs, technical support, and pre-existing water rights and regulations affect project outcomes. The diversity and geographic dispersion of water conflicts suggests potential for applying the interconnected game approach to US-Mexico water negotiations. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)101-111
Number of pages11
JournalAgricultural Economics
Volume24
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2000

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water management
Mexico
water
North American Free Trade Agreement
water rights
game theory
NAFTA
funding
pollution
border
project
Water management
Water
Management games
Transboundary
city

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • Transboundary water management
  • US-Mexico border

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Agronomy and Crop Science
  • Forestry
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Transboundary water management game-theoretic lessons for projects on the US-Mexico border. / Frisvold, George B; Caswell, Margriet F.

In: Agricultural Economics, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2000, p. 101-111.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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