Abstract
J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather than sui generis; (ii) that this explanatory burden can be successfully met vis-à-vis the supervenience of the mental upon the physical, and in other related cases; and (iii) that the burden cannot be met for (putative) objective moral supervenience relations.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 221-260 |
| Number of pages | 40 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 92 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Aug 1992 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences(all)
Cite this
Troubles on moral twin earth : Moral queerness revived. / Horgan, Terence E; Timmons, Mark C.
In: Synthese, Vol. 92, No. 2, 08.1992, p. 221-260.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Troubles on moral twin earth
T2 - Moral queerness revived
AU - Horgan, Terence E
AU - Timmons, Mark C
PY - 1992/8
Y1 - 1992/8
N2 - J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather than sui generis; (ii) that this explanatory burden can be successfully met vis-à-vis the supervenience of the mental upon the physical, and in other related cases; and (iii) that the burden cannot be met for (putative) objective moral supervenience relations.
AB - J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather than sui generis; (ii) that this explanatory burden can be successfully met vis-à-vis the supervenience of the mental upon the physical, and in other related cases; and (iii) that the burden cannot be met for (putative) objective moral supervenience relations.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0039680321&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0039680321&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/BF00414300
DO - 10.1007/BF00414300
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0039680321
VL - 92
SP - 221
EP - 260
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
SN - 0039-7857
IS - 2
ER -