Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revived

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

83 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather than sui generis; (ii) that this explanatory burden can be successfully met vis-à-vis the supervenience of the mental upon the physical, and in other related cases; and (iii) that the burden cannot be met for (putative) objective moral supervenience relations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)221-260
Number of pages40
JournalSynthese
Volume92
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1992
Externally publishedYes

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naturalism
realism
Supervenience
Queerness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Troubles on moral twin earth : Moral queerness revived. / Horgan, Terence E; Timmons, Mark C.

In: Synthese, Vol. 92, No. 2, 08.1992, p. 221-260.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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