Two wrongs do not make a right: Responsibility and overdetermination

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper I critically examine Michael Moore's views about responsibility in overdetermination cases. Moore argues for an asymmetrical view concerning actions and omissions: whereas our actions can make us responsible in overdetermination cases, our omissions cannot. Moore argues for this view on the basis of a causal claim: actions can be causes but omissions cannot. I suggest that we should reject Moore's views about responsibility and overdetermination. I argue, in particular, that our omissions (just like our actions) can make us responsible in overdetermination cases. I go on to provide an account of how this may be possible.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)473-490
Number of pages18
JournalLegal Theory
Volume18
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Law

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