Untying a knot from the inside out: Reflections on the "paradox" of supererogation

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Abstract

In his seminal essay "Saints and Heroes"(1958), J. O. Urmson argued that the then-dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions-as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong-ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory1. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are "beyond the call of duty" (beyond what is obligatory) and, hence, actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a controversial category. Some have argued that the concept of supererogation is paradoxical because on one hand, supererogatory actions are (by definition) supposed to be morally good, indeed morally best, actions. But then if they are morally best, why aren't they morally required, contrary to the assumption that they are morally optional? In short: how can an action that is morally best to perform fail to be what one is morally required to do? The source of this alleged paradox has been dubbed the good-ought tie-up. In our article, we address this alleged paradox by first making a phenomenological case for the reality of instances of genuine supererogatory actions, and then, by reflecting on the relevant phenomenology, explaining why there is no genuine paradox. Our explanation appeals to the idea that moral reasons can play what we call a merit conferring role. The basic idea is that moral reasons that favor supererogatory actions function to confer merit on the actions they favorthey play a merit conferring roleand can do without also requiring the actions in question. Hence, supererogatory actions can be both good and morally meritorious to perform yet still be morally optional. Recognition of a merit conferring role unties the good-ought tie up, and (as we further argue) there are good reasons, independent of helping to resolve the alleged paradox, for recognizing this sort of role that moral reasons may play.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)29-63
Number of pages35
JournalSocial Philosophy and Policy
Volume27
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2010

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phenomenology
obligation
appeal
Supererogation
Paradox
Merit
Moral Reasons

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

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abstract = "In his seminal essay {"}Saints and Heroes{"}(1958), J. O. Urmson argued that the then-dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions-as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong-ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory1. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are {"}beyond the call of duty{"} (beyond what is obligatory) and, hence, actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a controversial category. Some have argued that the concept of supererogation is paradoxical because on one hand, supererogatory actions are (by definition) supposed to be morally good, indeed morally best, actions. But then if they are morally best, why aren't they morally required, contrary to the assumption that they are morally optional? In short: how can an action that is morally best to perform fail to be what one is morally required to do? The source of this alleged paradox has been dubbed the good-ought tie-up. In our article, we address this alleged paradox by first making a phenomenological case for the reality of instances of genuine supererogatory actions, and then, by reflecting on the relevant phenomenology, explaining why there is no genuine paradox. Our explanation appeals to the idea that moral reasons can play what we call a merit conferring role. The basic idea is that moral reasons that favor supererogatory actions function to confer merit on the actions they favorthey play a merit conferring roleand can do without also requiring the actions in question. Hence, supererogatory actions can be both good and morally meritorious to perform yet still be morally optional. Recognition of a merit conferring role unties the good-ought tie up, and (as we further argue) there are good reasons, independent of helping to resolve the alleged paradox, for recognizing this sort of role that moral reasons may play.",
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