Verifying ADS-B navigation information through Doppler shift measurements

Nirnimesh Ghose, Loukas Lazos

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recent efforts to modernize aviation traffic control have mandated the gradual replacement of the existing analogue radar system with a next-generation (NextGen) digital one. Part of this NextGen system is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) standard. ADS-B aims at improving aviation safety by enabling aircraft broadcast navigation information. However, the current ADS-B standard does not provide mechanisms for verifying the integrity of navigation broadcasts. Consequently, aircraft trajectories can be easily spoofed. In this paper, we address the problem of verifying the navigation information of ADS-B transmissions. Fundamentally, this is a classical message integrity problem that can be addressed with cryptographic methods. However, cryptographic primitives are not part of ADS-B, primarily due to standardization and key management challenges. To address the shortcomings of ADS-B, we propose a PHY-layer verification method that exploits RF attributes of ADS-B transmissions to verify the aircraft's velocity and position. Specifically, we exploit the short coherence time of the wireless channel and the Doppler spread phenomenon to detect spoofed ADS-B messages broadcasted by a rogue ground station. We show that the security offered by our verification method is equivalent to the hardness of under defied quadratic equation systems, which are used in public-key cryptography.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015
Subtitle of host publicationImpact of Global Mandates on Avionics Research and Development
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages4A21-4A211
ISBN (Electronic)9781479989409
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 28 2015
Event34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015 - Prague, Czech Republic
Duration: Sep 13 2015Sep 17 2015

Other

Other34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015
CountryCzech Republic
CityPrague
Period9/13/159/17/15

Fingerprint

Doppler effect
Navigation
Aircraft
Aviation
Public key cryptography
Traffic control
Radar systems
Standardization
Hardness
Trajectories

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Ghose, N., & Lazos, L. (2015). Verifying ADS-B navigation information through Doppler shift measurements. In 34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015: Impact of Global Mandates on Avionics Research and Development (pp. 4A21-4A211). [7311412] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/DASC.2015.7311412

Verifying ADS-B navigation information through Doppler shift measurements. / Ghose, Nirnimesh; Lazos, Loukas.

34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015: Impact of Global Mandates on Avionics Research and Development. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. p. 4A21-4A211 7311412.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Ghose, N & Lazos, L 2015, Verifying ADS-B navigation information through Doppler shift measurements. in 34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015: Impact of Global Mandates on Avionics Research and Development., 7311412, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 4A21-4A211, 34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015, Prague, Czech Republic, 9/13/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/DASC.2015.7311412
Ghose N, Lazos L. Verifying ADS-B navigation information through Doppler shift measurements. In 34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015: Impact of Global Mandates on Avionics Research and Development. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2015. p. 4A21-4A211. 7311412 https://doi.org/10.1109/DASC.2015.7311412
Ghose, Nirnimesh ; Lazos, Loukas. / Verifying ADS-B navigation information through Doppler shift measurements. 34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015: Impact of Global Mandates on Avionics Research and Development. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. pp. 4A21-4A211
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