Abstract
Recent efforts to modernize aviation traffic control have mandated the gradual replacement of the existing analogue radar system with a next-generation (NextGen) digital one. Part of this NextGen system is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) standard. ADS-B aims at improving aviation safety by enabling aircraft broadcast navigation information. However, the current ADS-B standard does not provide mechanisms for verifying the integrity of navigation broadcasts. Consequently, aircraft trajectories can be easily spoofed. In this paper, we address the problem of verifying the navigation information of ADS-B transmissions. Fundamentally, this is a classical message integrity problem that can be addressed with cryptographic methods. However, cryptographic primitives are not part of ADS-B, primarily due to standardization and key management challenges. To address the shortcomings of ADS-B, we propose a PHY-layer verification method that exploits RF attributes of ADS-B transmissions to verify the aircraft's velocity and position. Specifically, we exploit the short coherence time of the wireless channel and the Doppler spread phenomenon to detect spoofed ADS-B messages broadcasted by a rogue ground station. We show that the security offered by our verification method is equivalent to the hardness of under defied quadratic equation systems, which are used in public-key cryptography.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015 |
| Subtitle of host publication | Impact of Global Mandates on Avionics Research and Development |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
| Pages | 4A21-4A211 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781479989409 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 28 2015 |
| Event | 34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015 - Prague, Czech Republic Duration: Sep 13 2015 → Sep 17 2015 |
Other
| Other | 34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015 |
|---|---|
| Country | Czech Republic |
| City | Prague |
| Period | 9/13/15 → 9/17/15 |
Fingerprint
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Aerospace Engineering
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Cite this
Verifying ADS-B navigation information through Doppler shift measurements. / Ghose, Nirnimesh; Lazos, Loukas.
34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015: Impact of Global Mandates on Avionics Research and Development. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. p. 4A21-4A211 7311412.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Verifying ADS-B navigation information through Doppler shift measurements
AU - Ghose, Nirnimesh
AU - Lazos, Loukas
PY - 2015/10/28
Y1 - 2015/10/28
N2 - Recent efforts to modernize aviation traffic control have mandated the gradual replacement of the existing analogue radar system with a next-generation (NextGen) digital one. Part of this NextGen system is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) standard. ADS-B aims at improving aviation safety by enabling aircraft broadcast navigation information. However, the current ADS-B standard does not provide mechanisms for verifying the integrity of navigation broadcasts. Consequently, aircraft trajectories can be easily spoofed. In this paper, we address the problem of verifying the navigation information of ADS-B transmissions. Fundamentally, this is a classical message integrity problem that can be addressed with cryptographic methods. However, cryptographic primitives are not part of ADS-B, primarily due to standardization and key management challenges. To address the shortcomings of ADS-B, we propose a PHY-layer verification method that exploits RF attributes of ADS-B transmissions to verify the aircraft's velocity and position. Specifically, we exploit the short coherence time of the wireless channel and the Doppler spread phenomenon to detect spoofed ADS-B messages broadcasted by a rogue ground station. We show that the security offered by our verification method is equivalent to the hardness of under defied quadratic equation systems, which are used in public-key cryptography.
AB - Recent efforts to modernize aviation traffic control have mandated the gradual replacement of the existing analogue radar system with a next-generation (NextGen) digital one. Part of this NextGen system is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) standard. ADS-B aims at improving aviation safety by enabling aircraft broadcast navigation information. However, the current ADS-B standard does not provide mechanisms for verifying the integrity of navigation broadcasts. Consequently, aircraft trajectories can be easily spoofed. In this paper, we address the problem of verifying the navigation information of ADS-B transmissions. Fundamentally, this is a classical message integrity problem that can be addressed with cryptographic methods. However, cryptographic primitives are not part of ADS-B, primarily due to standardization and key management challenges. To address the shortcomings of ADS-B, we propose a PHY-layer verification method that exploits RF attributes of ADS-B transmissions to verify the aircraft's velocity and position. Specifically, we exploit the short coherence time of the wireless channel and the Doppler spread phenomenon to detect spoofed ADS-B messages broadcasted by a rogue ground station. We show that the security offered by our verification method is equivalent to the hardness of under defied quadratic equation systems, which are used in public-key cryptography.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85010049737&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85010049737&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/DASC.2015.7311412
DO - 10.1109/DASC.2015.7311412
M3 - Conference contribution
SP - 4A21-4A211
BT - 34th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, DASC 2015
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ER -