Voting with their feet: Institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover

Robert Parrino, Richard W Sias, Laura T. Starks

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

331 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate whether institutional investors "vote with their feet" when dissatisfied with a firm's management by examining changes in equity ownership around forced CEO turnover. We find that aggregate institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors decline in the year prior to forced CEO turnover. However, selling by institutions is far from universal. Overall, there is an increase in shareholdings of individual investors and a decrease in holdings of institutional investors who are more concerned with holding prudent securities, are better informed, or are engaged in momentum trading. Measures of institutional ownership changes are negatively related to the likelihoods of forced CEO turnover and that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3-46
Number of pages44
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume68
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2003
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

CEO turnover
Institutional investors
Ownership change
Institutional ownership
Voting
Chief executive officer
Vote
Individual investors
Equity ownership
Shareholding
Momentum trading

Keywords

  • CEO turnover
  • Corporate governance
  • Institutional investors

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Strategy and Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Voting with their feet : Institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover. / Parrino, Robert; Sias, Richard W; Starks, Laura T.

In: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, No. 1, 01.04.2003, p. 3-46.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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