### Abstract

Several philosophers have used the framework of means/ends reasoning to explain the methodological choices made by scientists and mathematicians (see, e.g., Goldman 1999, Levi 1962, Maddy 1997). In particular, they have tried to identify the epistemic objectives of scientists and mathematicians that will explain these choices. In this paper, the framework of means/ends reasoning is used to study an important methodological choice made by mathematicians. Namely, mathematicians will only use deductive proofs to establish the truth of mathematical claims. In this paper, I argue that none of the epistemic objectives of mathematicians that are currently on the table provide a satisfactory explanation of this rejection of probabilistic proofs.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 373-388 |

Number of pages | 16 |

Journal | Logique et Analyse |

Volume | 45 |

Issue number | 179-180 |

State | Published - 2002 |

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### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Philosophy

### Cite this

*Logique et Analyse*,

*45*(179-180), 373-388.

**What do mathematicians want? Probabilistic proofs and the epistemic goals of mathematicians.** / Fallis, Don T.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

*Logique et Analyse*, vol. 45, no. 179-180, pp. 373-388.

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - What do mathematicians want? Probabilistic proofs and the epistemic goals of mathematicians

AU - Fallis, Don T

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - Several philosophers have used the framework of means/ends reasoning to explain the methodological choices made by scientists and mathematicians (see, e.g., Goldman 1999, Levi 1962, Maddy 1997). In particular, they have tried to identify the epistemic objectives of scientists and mathematicians that will explain these choices. In this paper, the framework of means/ends reasoning is used to study an important methodological choice made by mathematicians. Namely, mathematicians will only use deductive proofs to establish the truth of mathematical claims. In this paper, I argue that none of the epistemic objectives of mathematicians that are currently on the table provide a satisfactory explanation of this rejection of probabilistic proofs.

AB - Several philosophers have used the framework of means/ends reasoning to explain the methodological choices made by scientists and mathematicians (see, e.g., Goldman 1999, Levi 1962, Maddy 1997). In particular, they have tried to identify the epistemic objectives of scientists and mathematicians that will explain these choices. In this paper, the framework of means/ends reasoning is used to study an important methodological choice made by mathematicians. Namely, mathematicians will only use deductive proofs to establish the truth of mathematical claims. In this paper, I argue that none of the epistemic objectives of mathematicians that are currently on the table provide a satisfactory explanation of this rejection of probabilistic proofs.

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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=28844492169&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:28844492169

VL - 45

SP - 373

EP - 388

JO - Logique et Analyse

JF - Logique et Analyse

SN - 0024-5836

IS - 179-180

ER -