When it's not the only game in town: The effect of bilateral search on the quality of a dealer market

Christopher G Lamoureux, Charles R. Schnitzlein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where we allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large-unlike in models with risk-neutral, competitive dealers. However, when we allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)683-712
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Finance
Volume52
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 1997
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Bilateral
Dealer markets
Dealers
Profit
Traders
Liquidity
Experimental asset markets
Insider
Bilateral trade
Price discovery

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

When it's not the only game in town : The effect of bilateral search on the quality of a dealer market. / Lamoureux, Christopher G; Schnitzlein, Charles R.

In: Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 2, 06.1997, p. 683-712.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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