WHERE DOES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REALLY COME FROM? CONSTITUTIONAL RULE AMONG THE CONTEMPORARY SIOUX AND APACHE

Stephen E Cornell, JOSEPH P. KALT

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Governments are public goods that provide the organizational and legal structures by which societies arrange and enforce “rules of the game” that enable divisions of labor, exchange, and collective action. We argue that shared, pre‐constitutional cultural norms of political legitimacy among rational individuals provide the foundations of effective self‐government. The performance of contemporary Apache and Sioux economies on Indian reservations governed by common federally imposed constitutions is examined to test the framework. Unlike the impoverished Sioux, the relatively successful Apaches are found to have pre‐existing political norms that (serendipidously) match the structure of their formal constitution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)402-426
Number of pages25
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume33
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1995
Externally publishedYes

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Constitution
Economic development
Reservation
Political legitimacy
Division of labor
Government
Collective action

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

WHERE DOES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REALLY COME FROM? CONSTITUTIONAL RULE AMONG THE CONTEMPORARY SIOUX AND APACHE. / Cornell, Stephen E; KALT, JOSEPH P.

In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1995, p. 402-426.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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