Whose argumentative burden, which incompatibilist arguments? - Getting the dialectic right

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Kadri Vihvelin has recently argued that between compatibilists and incompatibilists, the incompatibilists have a greater dialectical burden than compatibilists. According to her, both must show that free will is possible, but beyond this the incompatibilists must also show that no deterministic worlds are free will worlds. Thus, according to Vihvelin, so long as it is established that free will is possible, all the compatibilist must do is show that the incompatibilists' arguments are ineffective. I resist Vihvelin's assessment of the dialectical burdens of compatibilists and incompatibilists, as well as her assessment of the best arguments for incompatibilism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)429-443
Number of pages15
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume88
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2010
Externally publishedYes

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Incompatibilist
Burden
Dialectics
Compatibilist
Free Will
Incompatibilism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Whose argumentative burden, which incompatibilist arguments? - Getting the dialectic right. / McKenna, Michael S.

In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88, No. 3, 09.2010, p. 429-443.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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