Why do controlling families of public firms sell their remaining ownership stake?

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27 Scopus citations

Abstract

I investigate what leads controlling families of publicly traded firms to sell their remaining ownership stake. The sale of a controlling stake is best explained in the context of theories of the firm related to optimal risk bearing, the separation of ownership and management expertise, the CEO succession process, and the monitoring provided by outside blockholders. A timing explanation is only marginally supported. The sale of a controlling stake is not explained by insufficient financial resources to fully invest in growth opportunities. This study offers insights into the final stage of the process in which entrepreneurs sequentially sell their firm to outside parties and also identifies the nature of costs of concentrated ownership. COPYRIGHT 2007, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)339-368
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume42
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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